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SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE ADMINISTRATION OF
COMPULSORY FINAL OFFER ARBITRATION
PROCEDURES
GEORGE R. FLEISCHLI*
Much has transpired in the fourteen years that have elapsed since
Professor Carl Stevens' first proposed final offer arbitration as a form
of compulsory interest arbitration that would operate as a strike substi-
tute which was compatible with collective bargaining. A number of
jurisdictions have enacted laws incorporating some variant of his pro-
posal as a compulsory procedure to resolve impasses in public sector
labor disputes.2 As a result, a substantial body of literature has devel-
oped discussing these laws, attempting to analyze their impact on the
collective bargaining process.3 Consequently, numerous other jurisdic-
tions, also concerned with alternative ways to deal with impasses and
strikes in the public sector, are turning to this body of existing laws and
literature for guidance.
The structure of these laws and the overall results reached under
them are the most important considerations to be used when deciding
whether to adopt such a procedure. Key provisions of these laws, and
* General Counsel, Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission. B.S., J.D., M.A., Uni-
versity of Illinois. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's own and do not reflect
the views of the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.
1. Stevens, Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining?, 5 IND. REL. 38 (1966)
[hereinafter referred to as Stevens I]. See generally Stevens, The Management of Labor Disputes in
the Public Sector, 51 ORE. L. REV. 181 (1971) [hereinafter referred to as Stevens II].
The term "final offer" as used herein refers to any form of compulsory interest arbitration
where the arbitrator must select the final proposal of the employer or union, or in some jurisdic-
tions the fact-finder, on the unresolved issues either as a total package or on an issue-by-issue
basis. While Stevens originally referred to such arbitration as "either/or" or "one or the other"
arbitration, others have used more colorful phrases such as "sudden death" arbitration. See
Feuille & Long, Final Offer Arbitration." Sudden Death in Eugene, 27 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 186
(1974) [hereinafter referred to as Final Offer Arbitration].
The term most frequently used to describe this form of arbitration is "final offer" or, occa-
sionally, "last best offer".
2. See text accompanying notes 21-72 infra. Final offer arbitration was first proposed legis-
latively by President Nixon as one of several mechanisms in an "arsenal of weapons" to deal with
emergency disputes in the transportation industry. See S. 3526, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). Final
offer arbitration has also been adopted as an impasse resolving mechanism for individual contract
disputes in major league baseball. See Dworkin, The Impact of Final Offer Arbitration on Bargain-
ing: The Case of Major League Baseball, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 29TH ANNUAL MEETING, IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 161 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Feigenbaum, Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory Than Practice, 14 IND. REL.
311 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Feigenbaum]; Wheeler, Closed-Offer. Alternative To Final
Offer Selection, 16 IND. REL. 298 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Wheeler].
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the regulations adopted for their implementation, may have a particu-
lar effect on the relative success of the legislation. It is the purpose of
this article to identify some of the problems which have been encoun-
tered in the administration of existing final offer laws in order to pro-
vide some guidance for those jurisdictions which have recently enacted
such laws or are considering such legislation for the first time.
A review of the literature4 suggests that there is a great deal of
information available concerning the operation of these laws and their
relative success in achieving the goal of inducing voluntary settlements
without stifling the bargaining process or creating undue reliance on
the procedure itself. However, very little attention has been directed to
the somewhat technical but potentially critical problems that can arise
in administering the process of final offer exchange which is the key
feature of the laws. For this reason, it has been necessary to draw heav-
ily on essentially three sources of information concerning these
problems: the implications of the laws themselves; 5 problems encoun-
tered in other jurisdictions; 6 and the experience in the State of Wiscon-
sin.7
This article first will outline the key features of the compulsory
final offer arbitration laws which have been enacted to date. These
laws will then be compared to the two models proposed by Professor
Stevens. Having established an analytical framework, this article then
will identify some of the problems which have been encountered under
these laws, as well as in their administration.
JURISDICTIONS WITH FINAL OFFER LAWS
By the fall of 1979, at least nine states, Connecticut, 8 Hawaii,9
Iowa,' Massachusetts," Michigan, 2 Montana, 13 Nevada, 14 New
Jersey,' 5 and Wisconsin 16 had adopted some form of compulsory final
offer arbitration to resolve public employee disputes. In addition, Eu-
4. See text accompanying notes 96-100 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 73-126 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 21-72 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 119-154 infra.
8. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-473e(c)(1) (Supp. 1979).
9. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (Supp. 1979).
10. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (1950).
11. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 9 (Supp. 1979).
12. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.231 (1969).
13. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-31-307 (Supp. 1979).
14. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.215(7)-288.215(8) (1977).
15. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-34:16(c)(3) (Supp. 1979).
16. WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11 1.70(4)(cm)6, 111.77(4)(b) (West Supp. 1979).
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gene, Oregon has adopted a municipal ordinance providing for final
offer arbitration; 1 7 significant largely because it was the first such law in
the country.1 8 As a consequence, a number of studies have been con-
ducted 19 and articles written 20 concerning the operation of these laws.
Eugene, Oregon
On September 13, 1971, Eugene, Oregon became the first public
sector jurisdiction 2' to adopt a compulsory final offer arbitration proce-
dure. The ordinance in question 22 provides that if bilateral negotia-
tions fail to produce an agreement within twenty-five days following
the commencement of negotiations, each party is required to submit a
final offer and may, at the same time, submit one alternative final of-
fer.23 The final offers are to be in the form of a complete draft of the
proposed agreement unless the parties agree to submit package propos-
als dealing only with the issues in dispute. A tripartite arbitration
panel, 24 which is prohibited from attempting to mediate or otherwise
settle disputes, must thereafter select the final offer which is the most
reasonable based on the selection criteria set out in the ordinance. 2
The panel may not consider other offers of settlement. 26 However, if
the parties agree to submit package proposals which are limited to the
issues in dispute, the panel is required to give consideration to the items
previously agreed to by the parties in determining which offer is most
reasonable.27
17. EUGENE, ORE. CODE § 2.876 (1971).
18. The Eugene Code was adopted on Sept. 13, 1971.
19. See e.g., Olson, Final Offer Arbitration in Wisconsin After Five Years, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 31ST ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 1 (1978) [here-
inafter referred to as Olson].
20. See, e.g., Sommers, An Evaluation of Final Offer Arbitration in Massachusetts, 6 J. OF
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 193 (1977); Stein, Final Offer Arbitration--
Initial Experience in Wisconsin, 97 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 39 (1974). See also sources listed at notes
97-98 infra.
21. Public sector jurisdiction here refers to:
A state and any of its agencies and institutions, including cities, counties and other politi-
cal subdivisions.
EUGENE, ORE. CODE § 2.876 (1971).
22. Id. §§ 2.875, 2.876.
23. Id. § 2.875(6).
24. One member is appointed by the city and another by the bargaining agent. The two
members then must agree upon a third member. Id. § 2.876(7)(a).
25. Id. § 2 .87 6(7)(g).




On April 21, 1972, Wisconsin adopted a compulsory interest arbi-
tration statute which provides for final and binding arbitration in law
enforcement and fire fighter negotiations. 28 The arbitrator is required
to select the single final offer of the employer or union on all issues in
dispute.29 Under this statute, the Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission 30 conducts an investigation in which a member of the staff
attempts to mediate the dispute and, if an impasse is reached, identifies
the issues in dispute and the parties' final offers.
31
In addition, Wisconsin has adopted a second compulsory interest
arbitration statute, effective January 1, 1978, which covers all munici-
pal employees, including county and school district employees. 32 This
statute requires the arbitrator to select the single final offer of one of the
parties on all issues in dispute.33 Although there are numerous differ-
ences between this law and the earlier legislation covering law enforce-
ment personnel and fire fighters, 34 the final offer provisions of the two
laws are essentially the same. In particular, although the arbitrator,
who is identified as a mediator-arbitrator in the later statute, is required
to endeavor to mediate the dispute,35 either party may amend its final
offer made during the WERC investigation without the express agree-
ment of the other party.
36
The second law provides that if both parties withdraw their final
offers, the union may lawfully strike after giving ten days notice.37 This
law also provides that the parties may agree to alternative forms of
arbitration or impasse resolution,38 but few have elected to do so.
39
28. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4) (West Supp. 1979).
29. Under this law, the parties may agree to an alternative form of arbitration where the
arbitrator has the power to decide all issues in dispute in a conventional manner. Id. In practice
such agreements are rare.
30. Hereinafter referred to as WERC.
31. WIS. STAT. ANN. § I I 1.77(4)(b) (West Supp. 1979).
32. Id. § 1I 1.70(4)(cm)6. This law is commonly referred to as "Senate Bill 15" or the "medi-
ation-arbitration" law.
33. Id.
34. Id. § 111.77.
35. Id. § iI 1.70(4)(cm)6.a.
36. Id. § 1I 1.70(4)(cm)6.b.
37. Id. § 11 1.70(4)(cm)6.c.
38. Id § II .70(4)(cm)5.
39. WERC records indicate that sixteen such agreements have been filed during the first two
years of the law. From 1973 through 1977, about sixty-five percent of the 852 negotiations were
settled without any third-party assistance. The approximately 300 remaining cases were mediated




Michigan adopted a conventional compulsory interest arbitration
law for police and fire fighters in 1969.40 In 1972, that statute was
amended to require that the arbitration panel select between the last
offer of the parties on each economic issue in dispute.4 1 The arbitration
panel is required to identify which issues are economic at or before the
conclusion of the hearing and the parties must then simultaneously
submit their final offers.4 2 Non-economic issues continue to be subject
to conventional arbitration.
Massachusetts
In 1973, Massachusetts became the third state to adopt a final offer
statute.43 Like Michigan, the Massachusetts arbitration statute is lim-
ited to police and fire fighters, and applies only if an impasse continues
after mediation and fact-finding. 4 Until recently, either party had the
right to invoke arbitration by a tripartite panel. Each party was re-
quired to submit a "written statement" of its "last and best offer" for
each of the issues still in dispute at the conclusion of the arbitration
hearing.4 5 The panel then was required to select one of the written
statements within ten days. Unless the parties had agreed to eliminate
fact-finding, the panel could also select the fact-finder's recommenda-
tions on any of the issues.
4 6
Massachusetts has recently amended this law4 7 to provide that the
availability of arbitration and the form of the arbitration must be de-
cided by a joint labor-management committee. Compulsory arbitra-
tion is still available to resolve police and fire disputes in
Massachusetts. The decision, however, as to whether the arbitration
panel will be limited to some form of final offer selection is now de-
cided on an ad hoc basis.
4 8
40. MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.231 (1967).
41. Id. § 423.238. It is interesting to note that, according to one estimate, the settlement rate
during arbitration, which was thirty-nine percent prior to this change, increased to sixty-four per-
cent thereafter.
42. Id. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.238 (1967).








Connecticut's final offer procedure, enacted during the 1975 legis-
lative session,4 9 cannot be invoked until after fact-finding. It is auto-
matically invoked ninety days after the expiration of a collective
bargaining agreement covering municipal employees if the Connecticut
Board of Mediation and Arbitration has not been previously requested
to provide its mediation services.50 The panel is tripartite and the par-
ties are permitted to file their offers in a "blind exchange" five days
after the hearing and filing of briefs, including reply briefs. The panel
must then select the "last best offer" on an issue-by-issue basis within
twenty days after the offers have been filed.
Connecticut recently enacted a new law providing for a similar
form of final offer arbitration for impasses in negotiations between
teacher organizations and school boards.5' Under the new impasse
procedure, which took effect on October 1, 1979, the dispute is submit-
ted to a single arbitrator or tripartite panel according to the agreement
of the parties. If the parties fail to agree to an arbitrator or arbitrators,
three arbitrators are appointed from a tripartite panel maintained by
the Connecticut Department of Education. A hearing is to be set
within ten days. The hearing may be continued, but must be concluded
twenty days after its commencement. The parties are required to sub-
mit to the arbitrator or arbitrators their respective positions on each
individual issue in dispute in the form of a "last best offer."' 52 The arbi-
trator or arbitrators must then select the last best offer of one of the
parties on each issue in dispute. They have fifteen days after the hear-
ing to render their decisions in writing detailing the nature of their de-
cision and the disposition of the issues.
It is unclear as to exactly when last best offers of the parties are to
be exchanged under this law. Therefore, it would appear that the arbi-
trators are free to determine when to call for final offers, either at the
outset or during the course of the hearing. This suggests that the last
best offers will be exchanged at or near the end of the hearing as is the
case under the prior law in Connecticut.
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473c (West 1979). However, this law has been found uncon-
stitutional by a Connecticut trial court. Town of Berlin v. Santaguida, No. 20-13-07 (Hartford
County Super. Ct., June 26, 1978).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 7-473c(c)(l).
52. Connecticut, as well as Iowa and Michigan, allows arbitrators to consider each outstand-
ing issue separately and select from one or the other side's final position on an issue-by-issue basis.
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Iowa
Iowa, the fifth state to adopt a final offer procedure, did so as part
of its comprehensive public sector bargaining law.53 The procedure is
applicable to all state and local employees covered by the law. The
arbitration procedure may not be invoked unless the parties have failed
to settle the matter based on a fact-finder's report. 54 Each party must
submit its final offer on each "subject category" still in dispute. 5" The
tripartite panel is then limited to selecting the final offer of one of the
parties or the fact-finder's recommendation on each impasse item.
56
Nevada
Nevada adopted a final offer arbitration procedure for fire fighters
in 1977.57 Until 1981, fire fighters, unlike all other Nevada municipal
employees are no longer governed by the unique impasse procedures of
Nevada's Local Government Employee-Management Relations Act.
58
Under that law, if the parties fail to agree to a different impasse proce-
dure, they must participate in mediation and if mediation fails, fact-
finding. They may agree in advance to accept some or all of the fact-
finder's recommediations as binding. If they fail to do so, the govenor
has the power, within certain limitations, to direct that the fact-finder's
recommendations be binding.
Under the new Nevada procedures, if the parties fail to agree to
make the fact-finder's recommendations binding, they must, within ten
days after the fact-finding report, submit all remaining issues to arbitra-
tion.59 A single arbitrator, selected from a panel of seven supplied by
the American Arbitration Association, thereafter holds a hearing where
the parties and other interested persons may present information con-
cerning the dispute. Before submission of final offers, the arbitrator
may recommend that the parties enter into negotiations and, if negotia-
tions actually begin, the hearing may be adjourned for three weeks. If
the parties do not enter into negotiations or fail to reach agreement,
53. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (1950).
54. Id. § 20.22(1). This provision provides that:
If an impasse persists after the findings of fact. . . the board shall have the power, upon
request of either party, to arrange for arbitration, which shall be binding.
Id.
55. Id. § 20.22(3).
56. Id. § 20.22(4). Any doubt as to the finalty of the offers initially submitted was resolved
by the Iowa Public Employment Relations Board in City of Des Moines, No. 1,079 (IPERB Dec.
Aug. 26, 1977).
57. NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.215 (1977).
58. Id. § 288.220.
59. Id. § 288.215(9).
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each party must submit a written statement containing its final offer on
all of the unresolved issues. The arbitrator must then select one of the
written statements on the basis of the same statutory criteria provided
for fact-finding.
New Jersey
In 1978, New Jersey adopted a final offer procedure for resolving
impasses. 60 Like Michigan, the procedure is only available to resolve
police and fire fighter disputes. However, other employee groups may
voluntarily agree to utilize the procedure if the legislative body for the
governmental unit involved approves. 61 Although the statute lists sev-
eral alternative types of procedures, the parties may voluntarily agree
to include several final offer variants. It mandates a particular form of
final offer arbitration for those parties who do not agree to utilize one
of the alternative procedures.
Like Nevada 62 and Iowa,63 arbitration is not available in New
Jersey unless the parties have been unable to resolve the dispute after a
fact-finder has made recommendations. Each party is required to sub-
mit its final offer prior to the arbitration proceedings. Economic pro-
posals, namely, those proposals which inure to the benefit of employees
financially, are treated as one item and non-economic issues are treated
as separate items. The arbitrator is then required, after a hearing, to
select one of the parties' offers as the most reasonable offer on an item-
by-item basis.
Hawaii
Hawaii's new law64 covers fire fighters only. Other employees con-
tinue to be covered by pre-existing impasse procedures which provide
for mediation and fact-finding under a statutory timetable, followed by
the right to strike sixty days after the fact-finder's report has been made
public.65 Under Hawaii's final offer procedure, impasses in fire fighter
negotiations are submitted to mediation three days after an impasse is
reached and arbitration fifteen days later. The law provides that if the
parties fail to mutually agree on an arbitration procedure within eight-
een days after impasse, a tripartite panel is to be appointed in accord-
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:A-16(c)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
61. Id.
62. NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.215(3) (1977).
63. IowA CODE ANN. § 20.22(1) (1950).
64. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (Supp. 1979).
65. Id. §§ 89-11(a) to 89-11(d) (Supp. 1979).
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ance with final offer provisions of the statute. If the arbitrators
appointed by the parties fail to agree to a third arbitrator within
twenty-four days, the third member is selected by the Hawaiian Public
Employment Relations Board from a list submitted by the American
Arbitration Association. 66 Final offers are to be submitted to the panel
upon its selection and the panel must hold a hearing within twenty
days.
The statute specifically provides that the parties may continue to
negotiate and participate in mediation up to the conclusion of the hear-
ing. 6 7 Thirty days after the hearing, the arbitrator must select one of
the two final offers in its entirety. It is unclear whether the law contem-
plates changes in the final offers during the proceedings before the arbi-
trator. The final offers must include all existing provisions of the
agreement which the parties wish to continue; all new provisions
agreed to; and all other proposals not agreed to.
Montana
Montana's recently enacted statute68 also applies only to fire
fighters. Previously, all public employees in Montana, including fire
fighters, were required to participate in mediation after a reasonable
period of negotiations or upon expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement. 69 Either party may request fact-finding after the expiration
of the agreement or thirty days after the certification of the union.
Under the terms of the Montana Public Employees Collective Bargain-
ing Act, 70 as interpreted by the Montana Supreme Court, public em-
ployees in Montana have the right to strike. 71
Under the new statute,72 fire fighters are prohibited from striking
and either party may, after exhausting the mediation and fact-finding
procedures, petition for final and binding arbitration. Arbitration is by
a single arbitrator selected from a list provided by the Montana Board
of Personnel Appeals. The arbitrator has the right to refer the issues
back to the parties for further negotiations. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the arbitrator requires the parties to submit their final posi-
tions on the matters in dispute and must, within thirty days of the com-
66. Id. § 89-11(d).
67. Id.
68. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-31-307 (Supp. 1979).
69. Id. § 39-31-308.
70. Id. §§ 39-31-301 to 39-31-311 (Supp. 1979).
71. Montana Dept. of Highways v. Public Employees Craft Council, 165 Mont. 349, 529 P.2d
785 (1974).
72. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-31-307 (Supp. 1979).
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mencement of the proceeding determine which party's final position
should be adopted.
COMPARISON TO STEVENS' MODELS
It is instructive to compare these various laws with the two model
final offer procedures first suggested by Professor Stevens. 73 One
model 74 calls for direct negotiations followed by arbitration, based on
the final positions of the parties presented to an "arbitration authority"
which would act "with no further hearing. '75 This model contemplates
no mediation or opportunity to compromise short of total settlement
during the arbitration phase.
The second model proposed by Professor Stevens 76 provides for
arbitration by a tripartite panel which would act only after a hearing
during which the neutral appointee would mediate, utilizing the im-
plicit threat of acceptance of the other party's offer as more reasonable
unless concessions were made. Fundamental to this latter procedure is
the right of the parties to change their offers up to the point in time
where an award is issued.
While none of the laws discussed above conform completely to
either model, the Eugene, Oregon ordinance 77 and the two Wisconsin
statutes78 more closely resemble the first of the two models. The stat-
utes in Connecticut, 79 Michigan, 80 Massachusetts, 81 Montana,82 New
Jersey,83 and Nevada84 have many features which cause them to more
closely resemble the second. The situation in Hawaii 85 is less clear be-
cause of the uncertainty as to whether either party has the right to
amend its final offer during the arbitration proceeding. The situation
in Iowa is somewhat difficult to categorize for reasons discussed more
fully below.
8 6
Under Eugene, Oregon's ordinance and the two Wisconsin stat-
73. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
74. See Stevens I, supra note 1, at 45-46.
75. Id at 46.
76. Id at 46-47.
77. EUGENE, ORE. CODE § 2.876 (1971).
78. WiS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(4)(cm)6, 111.77 (West 1971).
79. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-473c (1975).
80. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.231 (1967).
81. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9 (Supp. 1979).
82. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-31-307 (Supp. 1979).
83. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-16(c)(3) (West Supp. 1979).
84. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 288.215(7),(8) (1977).
85. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (Supp. 1979).
86. See text accompanying note 95 infra.
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utes, the parties may not, under ordinary circumstances, escape the risk
attendant upon making a final offer and submitting the dispute to the
arbitration process. In effect, the "strike substitute" which the final of-
fer procedure was intended to provide has a "strike deadline" under
these laws which occurs when the parties exchange their final offers and
terminate bilateral negotiations.87 Unless the parties are able to reach
total agreement or at least obtain the consent of the other party to
change their final offer, they run the very real risk of suffering a total
loss. Consequently, as anticipated by Stevens, "genuine negotiations"
occur prior to that point in time, greatly moderating the parties' posi-
tions and resulting in a maximization of bilateral settlements.
88
The provision for alternative final offers in the Eugene, Oregon
procedure is intended to and probably does have a moderating influ-
ence on this risk.89 However, the moderating influence, like the oppor-
tunity for mediation by the arbitrator under Wisconsin's most recently
enacted statute, does not eliminate the risk attendant upon failing to
reach agreement bilaterally before the "finalization" of offers. Simi-
larly, the fact that the arbitrators are required to conduct a hearing
under each of these laws if requested to do so,90 does not necessarily
result in a reduction of this risk. Such a requirement does force the
parties to re-evaluate their positions and provides them with one last
opportunity to eliminate the risk by reaching a bilateral agreement. 91
On the other hand, the statutes in Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Montana, New Jersey, and Nevada, in addition to containing many
features designed to reduce the potential harshness of the outcome of
final offer selection and the attendant risk of participation in the proce-
dure,92 also contain two features which cause them to more closely re-
semble Stevens' second model. The utilization of fact-finding as a
preliminary step, particularly where the arbitrator may select the fact-
finder's recommendations on a total package or issue-by-issue basis,
may be viewed as a disguised form of conventional arbitration. Under
most circumstances, the party that "prevails" on an issue or issues in
87. EUGENE, ORE. CODE §§ 2.876(6),(7) (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 11 1.70(4)(cm)6, 111.77
(4)(b) (West Supp. 1979).
88. See Stevens I, supra note 1, at 46.
89. See Donn, Games Final Offer Arbitrators Might Play, 6 IND. REL. 306 (1977). See also
Final Offer Arbitration supra note 1.
90. EUGENE, ORE. CODE § 2.876 (1971); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 11 1.70(4)(cm)6, 111.77 (West
Supp. 1979).
91. Id.
92. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-473e(c)(i) (1975); MASS. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 150E, § 9
(Supp. 1979); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-31-307 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-
16(c)(3) (West Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.215(8) (1977).
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fact-finding will ordinarily conform its final offer to the fact-finder's
recommendations. This process has obvious similarity to the second
procedure envisioned by Stevens where the neutral third party secures
the "voluntary" agreement of the parties to conform their final offers to
his or her view of the most reasonable outcome.93 More importantly,
the parties have the right to change their "final offers" after the juris-
diction of the arbitration panel has been invoked.94 Because the statute
in Iowa95 provides for fact-finding but also finalizes the offers at the
outset of the arbitration proceeding, it is difficult to categorize the Iowa
statute. However, on balance, the Iowa statute more closely resembles
the second model.
Some of the recent literature on final offer arbitration has been
devoted to criticizing the concept or analyzing the impact of existing
laws on bargaining and bargaining outcomes.96 Some commentators
97
discuss the effectiveness of achieving certain important goals such as
avoidance of the "chilling effect" 98 and avoidance of the "narcotic ef-
fect". 99
This body of literature provides invaluable background informa-
tion to those making the basic public policy choices as to which im-
passe procedure should be adopted to resolve public employe disputes
93. See Stevens 1, supra note I, at 47.
94. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7-473c(c)(1)(1975).
95. IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.22 (1950).
96. Articles which are generally critical of final offer arbitration include: Feigenbaum supra
note 3; Wheeler supra note 3; Zack, Final Offer Arbitration-Panacea or Pandora's Box, 19
N.Y.L.F. 567 (1974).
97. See generally Dworkin, Final Position Arbitration and Intertemporal Compromise, 30 RE-
LATIONS INDUSTRIELLES/INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, 250 (1977); Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration,
PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS LIBRARY, SERIES No. 50 (1975); Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and
the Chilling Effect, 14 IND. REL. 302 (1975); Feuille, Final Offer Arbitration and Negotiating Incen-
tives, 32 ARB. 203 (1977); Feuille & Dworkin, Final Offer Arbitration and Intertemporal Compro-
mise, or It's My Turn to Win, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 31ST ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 87 (1978); Grodin, Either-Or Arbitration for Public Employee
Disputes, 11 IND. REL. 260 (1972); Lipsky & Baracci, Final Offer Arbitration and Public Safety
Employees; the Massachusetts Experience, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 30TH ANNUAL WINTER MEET-
ING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCATION 65 (1978); Olson, Final Offer in Wisconsin
after Five Years, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3 IST ANNUAL MEETING, INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS RE-
SEARCH ASSOCIATION 111 (1978); Stem, Final Offer Arbitration---Initial Experience in Wisconsin,
97 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 39 (1974); Stem, Private Sector Implications of the Initial Wisconsin Final-
Offer Arbitration Experience, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 27TH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 82 (1974); Sommers, An Evaluation of Final Offer Arbitration in Mas-
sachusetts, 6 J. OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 193 (1977); Swimmer,
Final Position Arbitration and Intertemporal Compromise, The University of Alberta Compromise,
30 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES/INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 533 (1975).
98. This is the tendency to withhold concessions in bilateral negotiations or mediation in
order to preserve one's position for arbitration.
99. This is the tendency to overuse third party procedures rather than reaching negotiated
settlements.
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and, if compulsory arbitration is to be utilized, whether to adopt some
form of final offer selection. However, little space has been devoted to
the problems that have been encountered to date in administering such
laws. 100 Basically, these problems relate to the timing of the final offers
which includes the question of who controls the timing and the content
of the final offers.
PROBLEMS RELATED TO TIMING
It is undoubtedly true that, in the ultimate sense, no final offer is
ever "final" until it has been selected by the arbitrator.' 0 ' This is so
because the parties are always free to reach bilateral agreement on the
remaining issues in dispute or at least to agree to allow the other party
to make modifications after the offers have been "finalized" under the
statutory procedure. Putting these possibilities aside, however, there
must be some point under any statutory procedure where the parties
are required to "finalize" their offers.
Finalizing the Offers
It would appear that two basic patterns are followed in finalizing
offers under the existing final offer laws. On the one hand, in Eugene,
Oregon and Wisconsin, the offers are deemed "final" at the point in
time that the parties terminate bilateral negotiations. 102 In Iowa, they
become final after fact-finding but at the outset of arbitration. 0 3 On
the other hand, under the provisions of the Connecticut,' °4 Massachu-
setts, 10 5 Montana,' °6 and Nevada statutes, 07 the final offers are not
deemed final until the end of the arbitration proceeding. In New
Jersey, the same result was achieved by adopting an administrative rule
which has been sustained in two lower court challenges.
10 8
100. A significant exception is Rehmus, Is a Final Offer Ever Final?, 97 MONTHLY LAB. REV.
43, 44 (1974). See also Rebmus, Is a Final Offer Ever Final?, in PROCEEDING OF THE 27 TH AN-
NUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 77 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as
Rehmus.
101. See Rehmus note 100 supra.
102. See EUGENE, ORE. CODE § 2.876(6) (1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. § l.77(4)(cm)6.a (West
Supp. 1979).
103. In Iowa, the parties must submit final offers within four days of either party's request for
arbitration following completion of fact-finding. The parties may continue to negotiate, however,
until a decision is rendered. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 20.20, 20.22(2) (1950).
104. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473c(c)(1) (Supp. 1979).
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 9 (Supp. 1979).
106. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-31-308 (Supp. 1979).
107. NEV. REV. STAT. § 288.215 (1977).
108. Firemen's Mutual Benevolent Ass'n, Local No. 4, No. C-1109-79 (Essex County Super.
Ct. Dec. 20, 1979), presentlypending No. A-1571-79, (Essex County Super. Ct.) (Appellate Div.);
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The importance of establishing a clear statute or rule regarding the
timing of the finalization of offers cannot be overemphasized. If the
call for final offers is to function effectively as a substitute to the call for
a strike, the parties must be made to take the matter seriously. They
must be made to understand that once they have finalized their offers,
they have invoked a form of economic warfare in which there may be a
loser. The cost of non-agreement thereafter is measured by the
"spread" between their offers. If the consequences of having made a
final offer become murky, or worse yet, are viewed as unsubstantial, the
pressure that is intended to be present is greatly dissipated.
Wisconsin's first final offer law failed to deal adequately with this
particular reality. As originally worded, the statute permitted either
party to modify its final offer "within five days of the hearing." 10 9 If it
is assumed that this provision was intended to permit either party to
change its final offer five days prior to the hearing before the arbitrator,
the practical effect was to allow the parties to make changes in their
offers at a time when neither the WERC mediator nor the arbitrator
were present to help to settle the dispute." 10 Worse yet, the provision
encouraged the parties to utilize this opportunity to make surprise
moves, through blind exchanges of amendments, in the hope of out-
flanking the other party.
There is a tendency on the part of both parties to a dispute under a
final offer system of negotiating with a view to winning the possibly
inevitable arbitration proceeding. While the beneficial result of that
tendency is normally compromise and moderation of position, the
value of that tendency can be lost if the parties are permitted to pursue
practices which focus too much on winning the arbitration proceeding
and not sufficiently on achieving a voluntary settlement.
Consistent with the heavy emphasis placed on settlement through
bilateral negotiations and mediation in Wisconsin, the statute was
amended to provide that the final offers of the parties become final
when the WERC mediator/investigator transmits his or her advice to
the WERC concerning the impasse."' Neither party may now amend
its final offer thereafter without the written agreement of the other
Newark Firemen's Union of New Jersey v. City of Newark, No. C-347-78 (Essex County Super.
Ct., Nov. 9, 1978).
109. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 111.77(4)(b) (1971).
110. It is a tribute to the ingenuity of the parties and an indication of the importance of this
defect, that some parties jointly "interpreted" the statute to allow them to change their final offers
within five days after the hearing.
111. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77(4)(G) (West Supp. 1979).
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party." l2 Further, when Wisconsin enacted its comprehensive media-
tion-arbitration statute, it provided that once the parties have ex-
changed their final offers and the WERC has ordered mediation-
arbitration, neither party may modify its final offer during the media-
tion conducted by the mediator-arbitrator without the consent of the
other party." 13
Notwithstanding this experience in Wisconsin and a similar expe-
rience in Iowa," 4 New Jersey's recently enacted statute, which calls for
final offers at the outset of the arbitration procedure, has failed to deal
specifically with the problem of finalization, instead requiring the
adoption of administrative rules permitting modifications during the
hearing."15 This rule was subsequently tested in the courts. 16 Simi-
larly, Hawaii's statute" 7 appears to be ambiguous in this regard in that
it provides for an initial exchange of final offers upon selection of the
panel but is silent as to modifications.
Order of Presentation of Final Offers
Numerous other problems arise with regard to the timing of the
final offer procedure, ultimately raising the issue of who controls the
timing of the procedure. The answer to this question inevitably must
be the neutral third party administering the procedure at the time the
offers are finalized. Any other approach can result in practices which
tend to defeat the underlying purpose of the procedure-voluntary set-
tlement.
The problem that arises most frequently can best be described as
the question of "who goes first." Where the parties are unsophisticated
or the issues are straightforward, this is not usually a serious problem.
Both parties know or accurately anticipate the other party's position
and feel no disadvantage in any particular order of presentation. In
fact, many "final offers" are identical to the offers on the table or ex-
changed informally through the mediator at the time of impasse.
However, where the parties are sophisticated or the issues are sus-
ceptible to change because of the prospect of final offer selection, the
person administering the law at the point of finalization must take care
to insure that any procedure followed maximizes settlement opportuni-
112. Id.
113. Id. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.G.
114. See text accompanying notes 28-39 and 53-56 supra.
115. N.J. ADM. CODE ch.19, § 16-5-7(f) (1978).
116. See text accompanying note 108 supra.
117. HAW. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (Supp. 1979).
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ties rather than allows the parties to engage in practices which make
arbitration more likely to occur. In particular, if the parties are allowed
to determine for themselves when their offers are final without the ap-
proval of the mediator or arbitrator administering the law, they will be
tempted to make surprise concessions and modifications of position.
The net result may well be the need to proceed to final offer selection
on all of the issues, although there would have been a basis for settle-
ment of some or perhaps all of the remaining issues still in dispute had
the surprised party been apprised of the concessions or modifications of
position that would be contained in the other party's final offer." 1
8
Implicit in this problem is the assumption that once a party is
asked to present its final offer and it presents an offer under that label,
it may not thereafter change its offer even if it is surprised by the other
party's offer. This assumption, which flows naturally from a simple
reading of any of the statutes, is quickly dispelled as totally unworkable
by exposure to the process of exchanging final offers. The procedure
followed by the mediator or arbitrator administering the law must be
designed so that neither party is disadvantaged by the order of presen-
tation. In many cases, this necessarily means more than one exchange.
One way to proceed is to allow for an initial, simultaneous ex-
change, followed by an opportunity to make modifications to meet any
changes in the other party's position which were not anticipated. Once
this ground rule is established, it is a simple matter for one of the par-
ties to withhold a concession or other change of position until after the
initial exchange. Regardless of the reason why a party might choose to
change its position during this second exchange, either party may legiti-
mately desire to modify further its position at that point.
Another approach is to allow each party to change its position in
response to the changes in the other's position until such time as the
other party makes no further changes in response. This is probably the
best procedure. But it is flawed by the possibility that one of the parties
may so seriously overestimate the other party's potential for movement
that the first party will remain in an unrealistic posture even though the
other party has failed to change its position after having been given the
opportunity. While some might argue that such a result is consistent
with one of the basic tenets of final offer arbitration-that it be risky
and distasteful-such an argument focuses too much on the means and
not sufficiently on the end to be achieved.
118. It should be noted that an argument can be made for the value of allowing the parties to
so utilize the procedure, in the interest of discouraging resort to arbitration in future negotiations.
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Another procedure, available only where the individual calling for
the exchange of final offers is not also the arbitrator, is to advise the
parties that they may identify possible concessions through "mediator
proposals" which are not required to be included in their final offers
and, if not included, will not be disclosed to the arbitrator. This prac-
tice is very helpful in achieving mediated settlements and is compatible
with the two procedures discussed above. It does not necessarily pre-
vent the parties from attempting to withhold possible concessions until
the offers are finalized, if they believe arbitration is inevitable and that
such a practice will help them win. For example, if both sides believe
that arbitration over an issue such as inclusion of a fair share agree-
ment is inevitable, they may see some tactical advantage to withholding
a possible concession such as the making or withdrawing of a proposal
on dental insurance until such time as the other party has finalized its
position.
Under the Wisconsin procedure, prior to May 1978,119 each of the
WERC mediators was permitted to deal with this problem on an indi-
vidual basis. The exchange procedure varied greatly depending on the
individual mediator's practices and the parties' preferences. In addi-
tion, some mediators who attempted to pursue a strong policy of full
disclosure were confronted with situations where both parties refused
to cooperate. In a few instances, the parties attempted to insist on the
right to make blind exchanges through the mail after mediation had
failed to resolve the dispute. For this reason, the WERC adopted a rule
dealing with the problem. According to the rule: "[t]he Commission or
its agent shall not close the investigation until the Commission or its
agent is satisfied that neither party, having knowledge of the content of
the final offer of the other party, would amend any proposal contained
in its final offer .... 120
The WERC -was recently called upon to determine whether a
"ground rule" established by one of its mediators, which provided that
each party could modify its final offer only in response to a change in
the other party's offer, constituted a valid application of this rule.
121
The WERC held that if the ground rule is clearly established, effec-
tively communicated, and if the investigator closes the investigation
based on the ground rule, it constitutes a valid and enforceable applica-
tion of the policy reflected in this rule.122 However, the investigator in
119. See generally Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70, 111.77 (Supp. 1979).
120. Wis. ADM. CODE § ERB 31.09(2) (1978).
121. Milwaukee Area Tech. College, No. 17,402, at 8 (WERC Dec. Nov. 2, 1979).
122. Id
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the case held the investigation open for several weeks after the initial
exchange of final offers, during which time he successfully mediated a
settlement which was later rejected by the union's membership. The
investigator still had not officially closed the investigation at the time
that the employer indicated its desire to further modify its offer. The
thrust of this decision was to preserve the mediator's discretion to use
the particular ground rule in question in his efforts to insure compli-
ance with the policy reflected in this rule by giving controlling impor-
tance to the notice closing the investigation. The WERC reasoned that,
had the employer been made aware that the investigator was about to
close the investigation, the employer might well have further modified
its final offer position to reflect some of the concessions it was willing to
make in the mediation that preceded the tentative settlement.
The adoption of this rule was not without controversy within the
WERC and among the parties it serves. There are some mediators who
subscribe to the notion that it is therapeutic to allow the parties to pur-
sue practices which increase the risk of loss since, in the long run, this
policy will discourage use of the procedure.
The statutes of Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada,
and Montana 23 all specifically provide that the exchange of final offers
shall occur at the conclusion of the arbitration procedure. A practice of
allowing blind exchanges at that juncture would not only seem to pose
serious due process problems if one party were allowed to make a sig-
nificant change in position without affording the other party an oppor-
tunity to present evidence and arguments, 24 but it would seriously
jeopardize the settlement potential that such a change normally
presents. For these reasons, any procedure utilized by the arbitrator
ought to insure that the other party has an opportunity to further mod-
ify its position as well or at least respond to the merits of the other
party's position. New Jersey's rule,125 clarifying the ambiguity in its
law, deals with both the due process problem and the settlement poten-
tial. It provides that: "[t]he arbitrator may, in his or her discretion
accept a revision of position by either party on any issue until a hearing
is deemed closed, provided that the other party is given the opportunity
123. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-473c(c)(1) (Supp. 1979); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 150E,
§ 9 (Supp. 1979); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.231 (1967); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-3 1-
307 (Supp. 1979); NEV. REV. STAT. § 228.215 (1977).
124. This problem would appear to be particularly acute under the Connecticut law covering
municipal employees where the parties are allowed to submit their final offers in a blind exchange
five days after the exchange of reply briefs.
125. N.J. ADM. CODE ch. 19, § 16-5.7(0 (1978).
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to respond .... ,,126
PROBLEMS RELATED TO CONTENT
The problems related to the content of final offers fall into three
general areas: problems regarding completeness; problems regarding
legality; and problems regarding ambiguity.
Completeness
The Eugene, Oregon 27 ordinance is the only statute that requires
the parties to each submit a complete draft of the proposed collective
bargaining agreement unless the parties specifically agree to submit
package proposals dealing only with the issues in dispute. In the latter
situation, the arbitration panel, which is not permitted to mediate,1 28 is
required to give consideration to the tentative agreements reached by
the parties in their negotiations. 129 All of the statutes, except the Ha-
waii statute, would appear to limit the final offers to the issues in dis-
pute. 30 Under the procedure in Hawaii, the final offers are in three
parts consisting of existing provisions, new provisions agreed to, and all
other proposed provisions.1
3'
Under those statutes which evidence an intent that the final offer
be in the form of proposals on the issues in dispute, several potential
problems can arise. One of the parties may have entered into tentative
agreements on proposals with contingencies attached which may, in ef-
fect, make such proposals issues in dispute. If this is the case, the party
which attached the contingency ought to be permitted to force the other
party to include the proposal in its final offer. In one Wisconsin case,
132
a union had entered into a large number of tentative agreements to
change existing contract language on the somewhat unique but express
statement that such tentative agreements were contingent on agreement
being reached on all the remaining proposals, mostly economic, in
126. Id.
127. EUGENE, ORE. CODE § 2.876 (1971).
128. Id. § 2.876(7)(d).
129. Id. § 2.876(7)(g)(1).
130. This is somewhat unclear under the wording of the Wisconsin statute dealing with law
enforcement personnel and fire fighters. In the case Sheboygan County, No. 14,859 (WERC Dec.
Aug. 24, 1976), the WERC held that final offers were to be based on the issues in dispute rather
than submitted in the form of a complete collective bargaining agreement. This problem
prompted a more explicit treatment under the new mediation-arbitration procedure. WIs. STAT.
ANN. § 11 1.70(4)(cm)6.a (West Supp. 1979) requires the parties to execute a stipulation of agreed
upon matters to be included in the new agreement.
131. HAw. REV. STAT. § 89-11(d) (Supp. 1979).
132. City of Stevens Point, No. 12,639-A (WERC Dec. Sept. 25, 1974).
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which the union was most interested. It was understood that the union
had reserved the right to withdraw its tentative agreements if the matter
was submitted to arbitration. The WERC held that the union did not
commit a prohibited practice when it submitted a final offer which was
limited to economic improvements it was seeking, based on the provi-
sions of the expired agreement, with none of the changes tentatively
agreed to during negotiations. 33 In effect, the employer in that case
was required to include, as part of its final offer, all of its proposals that
the union had tentatively agreed to during negotiations.
Another related question that can arise is the status of matters
which are not in dispute. Tentative agreements reached on specific is-
sues in the bargaining process are invariably subject to some explicit or
implicit contingencies. Ratification by the union membership is one
such contingency which is all but universal. A second contingency,
normally operative in the public sector, is ratification by the legislative
body for the public employer. Normally, this would not take place un-
til a tentative agreement is reached on all issues in dispute. However,
when the parties submit final offers on the remaining disputed items,
the status of these tentative agreements remains in doubt. Presumably,
no ratification is necessary. The final offer which is ultimately selected
by the arbitrator is legally imposed on the parties. All that is required
is legislative action to implement the offer selected.
One possible way to avoid the ratification question is to agree to
make the tentative agreements a technical part of the final offers by
including a statement to the effect that each party's offer includes all
matters tentatively agreed to during negotiations. In a Wisconsin
case, 134 a municipal employer attempted to insist that each party be
required to submit a proposed collective bargaining agreement as its
final offer. The offers in question would have included all undisputed
language agreed to during the negotiations for a first contract, although
there were only a few remaining issues in dispute. It was the em-
ployer's theory that under the statute the arbitrator's award was a sub-
stitute for a collective bargaining agreement.
35
Under the procedure set out in the Eugene, Oregon ordinance, this
approach would have been appropriate. 36 However, in view of the
fact that the first Wisconsin statute, 37 like all the other statutes except
133. Id at 5, 11.
134. Sheboygan County, No. 14,859 (WERC Dec. Aug. 24, 1976).
135. Id at 3.
136. See generall, EUGENE, ORE. CODE § 2.876 (1971).
137. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.77 (1974).
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Hawaii's, requires only that the parties submit final offers on the issues
in dispute, the WERC determined that it was inappropriate to require
the parties to draft final offers in the form of a total agreement.
38
This has led to a subsequent problem in Wisconsin where the same
municipal employer ultimately refused to execute a collective bargain-
ing agreement prepared by the union which included all of the items
from the arbitrator's award which incorporated the union's final offer
on the issues in dispute. 139 The employer implemented the terms of the
award but maintained that it had no obligation to execute an agree-
ment, particularly in light of the fact that it had never acted on the
tentative agreements. The WERC held that the employer was obli-
gated under its duty to bargain in good faith to execute the agreement
and that it could not use its own failure to adopt the tentative agree-
meats as justification for refusing to execute the proferred agree-
ment.14° The best way to deal with this particular problem is through
legislative action, as was done in Hawaii and under Wisconsin's most
recent law.1a ' Of course, the same result can be accomplished by rule.
Legality
Compulsory arbitration allows either party to force a proposal to
resolution and possible inclusion in a collective bargaining agreement.
Therefore, it is inevitable that disputes may arise over the duty to arbi-
trate a particular proposal. While this is true of conventional arbitra-
tion as well as final offer arbitration, it poses a particularly difficult
problem in final offer arbitration because the arbitrator may not have
the authority to modify either party's final offer at the time that the
issue is raised. The problem is particularly acute in jurisdictions like
Eugene, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Iowa where the offers are finalized
before submission to arbitration. In these situations, it is advisable to
establish a procedure for making timely objections to the legality of
particular proposals.
The most common problem affects proposals which are alleged to
be non-mandatory subjects of bargaining. In jurisdictions where the
final offers are finalized before submission to arbitration, the procedure
should require the parties to raise any objection concerning the alleged
non-mandatory nature of proposals at some point prior to the finaliza-
138. Sheboygan County, No. 14,859, at 4 (WERC Dec. Aug. 24, 1976).
139. Sheboygan County, No. 15,380-B (WERC Dec. Apr. 13, 1978), aff'dsub. nom. Sheboy-
gan County v. WERC, No. 163-032 (Dane County Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1979).
140. Sheboygan County, No. 15,380-B, at 4-5 (WERC Dec. Apr. 13, 1978).
141. WiS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(4)(cm)6.a (West Supp. 1979).
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tion of offers. This approach is followed in Wisconsin where the parties
are permitted to bargain concerning non-mandatory subjects up to the
close of the investigation before they are held to have waived their right
to object. 142 In jurisdictions where the parties exchange their final of-
fers before the arbitrator, it is less clear whether the procedure should
require the raising of such objections prior to the declaration of the
impasse. If not, a procedure should be established permitting the arbi-
trator to remand the dispute back to the administrative agency charged
with the responsibility for making such determinations.
One troublesome area that appears to have no solution is the han-
dling of proposals that are ultimately found to be prohibited subjects of
bargaining. This same problem would apply to final offers which, be-
cause of some procedural irregularity, are deemed to be illegal. The
failure to raise a timely objection that a proposal relates to a permissive
subject of bargaining is treated as a waiver in most jurisdictions. 43 But
it must be assumed that neither party may normally be deemed to have
waived an objection that a proposal is illegal. The question then arises
as to the proper procedure to follow when one party waits until the
offers are finalized or until after final offer selection before raising an
objection as to the legality of the other party's offer.
The first such case to arise in Wisconsin involved the latter type of
situation and ultimately went to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In that
case,144 the court found that there had been no bargaining on any pro-
posal for a two year agreement prior to the original submission of final
offers. The court concluded that the county's final offer, therefore, was
unlawful under the then existing procedure which called for the sub-
mission of final offers at the time of the alleged impasse subject only to
modification five days prior to the hearing. 145 The union, in that case,
was permitted to challenge the legality of the offer after the award was
issued. This same problem resulted in one arbitrator refusing to select
the final offer of the union where the union had included a new item,
142. Wis. ADM. CODE §§ ERB 31.10, 31.11 implementing the provisions of Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.70(4)(cm)6.a (West Supp. 1979), states:
Permissive subjects of bargaining may be included by a party if the other party does not
object and shall then be treated as a mandatory subject. ...
143. But see Ridgefield Park Ed. Ass'n v. Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ., 78 N.J. 144, 393 A.2d
278 (1978), where the court held that the parties may not lawfully bargain about matters which do
not fall within the mandatory duty to bargain.
144. Milwaukee County Deputy Sheriff's Ass'n v. Milwaukee County, 64 Wis. 2d 651, 221
N.W.2d 673 (1974).
145. Id. at 654, 221 N.W.2d at 676.
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never previously negotiated, prior to the exchange of final offers. 146
This problem is fraught with potential for abuse. A party, either
intent on frustrating the procedure, or more likely, focusing its atten-
tion primarily on winning rather than the manner by which that result
is achieved, could wait with the intent of springing its objection at the
most advantageous moment. While it is possible to establish a proce-
dure for remanding the dispute to the administrative agency charged
with making such determinations, as suggested above under the discus-
sion concerning permissive subjects of bargaining, that approach re-
sults in delay and frustration of the procedure. The approach taken by
two other arbitrators in Wisconsin was to refuse to consider the objec-
tion as to the possible illegality of a particular proposal in deciding
which final offer was the most reasonable.1 47 Both arbitrators stated
that they preferred to rely on the WERC or the courts to subsequently
review the proposal and remedy any problems as to legality.
48
Where the final offer selection is on an issue-by-issue basis, the
arbitrator has greater latitude to refuse to select an offer which is of
questionable legality. However, the problem with this approach is that
if a timely objection had been raised to the alleged illegality of the
proposal, the proponent of the proposal might have been in a position
to overcome the objection. For this reason, some parties have included
savings clause proposals in their final offers which require further bar-
gaining and possible arbitration in the event that any portion of its pro-
posal is finally declared illegal by an administrative agency or court
having competent jurisdiction. The inclusion of such proposals will no
doubt discourage the practice of waiting to challenge the legality of a
proposal in many circumstances. Another approach for dealing with
this problem is to adopt a rule which provides that the arbitrator may
permit changes in offers which have been finalized for the sole purpose
of overcoming objections as to the legality of proposals.
Another problem concerning the legality of final offers warrants
some special comment: the problem of final offers expressed in the al-
ternative. A final offer expressed in the alternative is probably not a
proper final offer in the absence of a specific authorization such as that
which is provided in the Eugene, Oregon ordinance. This is the conclu-
146. In re Arbitration Between Greendale Professional Policemen's Ass'n & Village of Green-
dale, No. 15,481-A (WERC Dec. Dec. 28, 1978).
147. In re Arbitration Between Manitowoc Educ. Ass'n & Manitowoc Pub. School Dist., No.
16,227-A, at 5-6 (WERC Dec. Aug. 2, 1978); In re Arbitration Between Fond du Lac Educ. Ass'n
& Fond du Lac School Dist., No. 16,345-A, at 3-4 (WERC Dec. Sept. 23, 1978).
148. Id
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sion reached recently by the WERC in Milwaukee Area Technical Col-
lege.14 9 Notwithstanding this result, the WERC went on to hold that
the parties may agree to submit final offers to the arbitrator expressed
in the alternative in whole or in part. 50 Presumably, they may also do
so if the other party does not object since public policy would not be
offended by such a practice.
One problem that arises when one of the final offers is expressed in
the alternative relates to how the arbitrator proceeds to evaluate the
final offers in question. If it occurs in an issue-by-issue jurisdiction, the
arbitrator is in effect called upon to evaluate the relative merits of three
proposals on that particular issue-not including the fact-finder's rec-
ommendation, if any. If it occurs in a total package jurisdiction, the
arbitrator is also called upon to evaluate the relative merits of three
total package offers, two of which may be identical in some respects. It
was largely for this reason that the WERC concluded that such an offer
was not a "single final offer" within the meaning of the statute and,
therefore, could not be submitted to arbitration over the objection or
absent the agreement of the other party.
Other problems can arise in the implementation of such offers. In
the Milwaukee Area Technical College case, the offer purported to give
both the union and the arbitrator a choice between three proposed sal-
ary schedules. Presumably, the arbitrator would have had the choice of
making the selection or giving the union the opportunity to do so. If
the arbitrator chose either course, it could raise an issue as to whether
the arbitrator had adopted the final offer of one of the parties on all
disputed issues without further modification as required. In addition, it
might be noted that one of the first court cases challenging an arbitra-
tion award in Wisconsin involved a dispute where the union's final of-
fer, which was selected by the arbitrator, was ambiguously worded,
referring as it did to both a percentage and a dollar figure in its wage
defiiand.' 51 While technically not an offer in the alternative, the case is
illustrative of what can happen if alternative proposals are not carefully
drawn.
149. No. 17,131-A (WERC Dec. Aug. 21, 1979).
150. Id.
151. Local 74, IAFF & City of Superior, No. 11,585-C (WERC Dec. July 27, 1973). This
dispute resulted in subsequent litigation in which the award ultimately was confirmed and en-




Either party's proposal, unilaterally drafted and submitted to arbi-
tration, is a potential source of ambiguity. A provision contained in a
collective bargaining agreement which is jointly agreed to reflects the
parties' mutual intent, however well or poorly drafted the provision
may be. The disputes that do arise concerning the meaning of such
provisions are normally raised in the grievance procedure and eventu-
ally become grist for the mill of grievance arbitrators. The grievance
arbitrator can refer to the bargaining history, as well as the practices of
the parties, for guidance as to their intended meaning. On the other
hand, disputes over the meaning of provisions submitted to interest ar-
bitration can, and do, arise during the course of the interest arbitration
proceeding itself; particularly where it is to the advantage of one party
to raise them.
The problem of ambiguity can generally be resolved in conven-
tional interest arbitration. There, the interest arbitrator can attempt to
reword the provision to reflect his or her intent in making the award.
However, in final offer arbitration, either party is ultimately in a posi-
tion to impose its version of a proposal on the other, thus creating a
much greater potential for dispute.
If the dispute arises during the course of the arbitration proceed-
ing, the proposal can be reworded in those jurisdictions permitting the
amendment of final offers during the course of the arbitration proceed-
ing. The problem is not so easily solved in those jurisdictions where the
offers are finalized prior to the arbitration proceeding. The proponent
can state what it intended the provision to mean, but it cannot compel
the other party to allow it to amend the proposal, if necessary, to reflect
that intent. It is for this reason that there is a tactical advantage to be
gained by waiting until the other party has "finalized" its offer before
objecting that a proposal is worded in such a way as to be subject to an
interpretation that is unreasonable, illegal, or in conflict with other pro-
visions of the agreement.
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It is the responsibility of the arbitrator to select the offer which is
most reasonable under the statutory criteria. Therefore, it would seem
reasonable that the best solution to this problem is to provide that the
152. If the provision is merely subject to an interpretation which is unfavorable to the party
making the proposal, it is more advantageous to the other party to wait until the proposal has been
ruled upon and, if it is included in the agreement, raise the objection as a basis for refusing to
implement the provision in the way intended- by the proponent. If the matter is submitted to
grievance arbitration, the other party can seek to envoke the rule of construction that a provision
should be most strictly construed against the draftsman.
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interest arbitrator has the authority to resolve such disputes in the
course of making the final offer selection. For the same reason, the
proper interpretation placed on a provision to be included in an agree-
ment through final offer selection probably should be deemed that
adopted by the interest arbitrator. Certainly, in looking at the "bar-
gaining history" of such a provision, a grievance arbitrator would have
to give great weight to such interpretation.
When the dispute over the interpretation does not arise until after
one party's final offer has actually been selected, it may result in a
grievance under the new agreement. At worst, it can result in delayed
implementation or challenges to the validity of the award itself.
For these reasons, care should be taken in scrutinizing the propos-
als of the parties before the offers are finalized to insure that they accu-
rately reflect the proponent's intent. In one Wisconsin case, 153 the non-
prevailing party attacked the award in part on the basis that one of the
union's proposals was not worded in a way so as to accomplish its in-
tended purpose. The city sought to include a residency requirement in
the agreement and the union resisted such proposal even though there
was a defacto practice of requiring residency. In effect, the union's
offer was a "no residency requirement" rather than a proposed contract
provision which would accomplish that result. The court reached the
pragmatic result that it would exercise its power to modify the award so
as to require the inclusion of such a provision in the agreement to effec-
tuate the actual intent of the union and the arbitrator.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND SOME POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The problems encountered in the administration of a final offer
arbitration law would not appear to have sufficient importance to con-
trol the outcome of the basic policy choice between final offer arbitra-
tion and conventional arbitration. While final offer arbitration laws
have a number of unique problems associated with their administra-
tion, none of those problems would appear to be insurmountable or
serve as a basis for avoiding its use.
First of all, in adopting a final offer procedure, careful considera-
tion should be given to the importance of the choice as to the timing of
the finalization process. The choice between finalizing offers prior to
the arbitration step or during the arbitration step will result in either
153. City of Mantiowoc v. Mantiowoc Police Patrolmen's Local 731, 70 Wis. 2d 1006, 236
N.W.2d 231 (1975).
154. Id at 1013, 236 N.W.2d at 236-37.
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strengthening or weakening any third party procedure which immedi-
ately precedes arbitration such as mediation or fact-finding. Moreover,
if the choice is to require the finalization of offers during the arbitration
step, that choice will not only weaken any third party procedure which
precedes arbitration, but it may also increase the number of cases taken
to and settled at the arbitration step of the mandated procedure. As the
Michigan experience has demonstrated, this approach really amounts
to the introduction of "mediation-arbitration" 55 and the indirect impo-
sition of a solution to the impasse which meets the approval of a third
party based on the statutory criteria.
A second consideration, closely related to and inseparable from
the first, is the choice as to who should control the procedure of final-
ization. Proper administration of a final offer law which will help
achieve the overall settlement objective suggests that the neutral third
party administering the law at the point of the finalization of offers,
must be in control of the procedure.
The determination whether the mediator or the arbitrator should
finalize the offers is inseparable from determining the timing of the
finalization process. The ultimate choice between these alternatives is
dictated by practical considerations such as the history of public sector
bargaining in the particular jurisdiction and the relative availability of
skilled and experienced mediators, arbitrators and mediator-arbitra-
tors.
With regard to the procedures to be followed in finalizing offers,
the third party neutral who is administering the law at the point of the
finalization of offers should probably be given considerable discretion.
However, it will no doubt prove necessary to provide some policy gui-
dance to this individual in the form of recommended procedures or
rules regarding the proper handling of the finalization process.
One approach, which is arguably consistent with one of the basic
tenents of final offer arbitration-that it is risky and distasteful to dis-
courage use-would suggest the adoption of rules and procedures
which would allow the parties an equal opportunity to attempt to for-
mulate a winning proposal without regard to full disclosure. The alter-
native approach, favored herein, is to devise procedures and rules
which insure full disclosure and tend to minimize if not eliminate the
area of dispute. If the basic outlines of the final offer law are suffi-
ciently fraught with risk, it is inappropriate to allow the parties to pur-
155. See Rehmus note 100 supra.
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sue practices which tend to reward cleverness and deception and result
in even harsher outcomes.
A legislative choice must be made as to whether the parties should
be required to make proposals in the form of complete agreements or
in the form of offers which are limited to the issues in dispute. If the
latter course is taken, as it has been in most instances, it may become
necessary to deal with a number of problems legislatively, by the adop-
tion of rules, or by decisions in contested cases. Probably the best solu-
tion is legislation or the adoption of rules designed to insure that any
award on the issues in dispute is ultimately incorporated into a compre-
hensive collective bargaining agreement. Such an agreement should
include the provisions of any expired agreement which are to be carried
forward in the new agreement; all matters unconditionally agreed upon
for inclusion in the new agreement; and the matters awarded by the
arbitrator.
Regardless of which legislative model is followed, a procedure
should be devised to allow the parties to raise timely objections con-
cerning the legality of the other party's final offer or any portion thereof
before the offers become final. To the extent that it is legally possible to
do so, the parties should be precluded from engaging in the practice of
withholding such challenges until after the offers have become finalized
or an award has been issued.
Finally, with regard to the problem of ambiguity, the neutral third
party who is administering the law at the point of finalization should
take care to insure that the parties' respective offers accurately reflect
their intended meaning and do not conflict with the other provisions of
the agreement or other provisions of law. If the offers have been final-
ized before the ambiguity or potential conflict has been identified, the
best practical solution would be to provide that the arbitrator may re-
solve any ambiguities and, if possible, interpret the provision in a way
that avoids any potential conflict. A savings clause either proposed by
the parties as part of their final offers or mandated by statute will also
help to eliminate this problem.
CONCLUSION
There have been a number of compulsory final offer arbitration
laws enacted since Professor Stevens first suggested final offer arbitra-
tion as a strike substitute that would help overcome some of the basic
objections to conventional arbitration. Much of the literature has been
devoted to an analysis of those laws and their relative success or failure
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in achieving the results intended. The purpose here has been to iden-
tify the basic outlines of those laws and to propose solutions to some of
the problems associated with administering such laws.
An analysis of the laws enacted to date indicates that there are two
basic patterns roughly conforming to the two models suggested by Ste-
vens, but containing numerous provisions largely designed to temper
the potential harshness of the outcome of final offer selection. An anal-
ysis of the operation of the final offer arbitration process demonstrates
that there are a number of problems associated with their proper ad-
ministration. Prominent among these are problems regarding the tim-
ing of the exchange of final offers, which require the adoption of
policies, practices or rules designed to maximize the settlement objec-
tive by preventing the parties from engaging in unwholesome practices
which might defeat that objective. Other problems regarding the con-
tent of the final offers must be effectively dealt with in order to achieve
the same objective and to avoid disputes and legal challenges. In par-
ticular, statutory provisions or rules should be adopted to insure proper
implementation of the award in the form of a written collective bar-
gaining agreement and to insure that disputes over the legality of a
particular proposal are raised and resolved in a timely manner so as not
to unduly interfere with the arbitration process or create problems re-
garding the implementation of awards. Disputes over the wording of
proposals should be minimized before the offers are finalized and, if
necessary, resolved as part of the interest arbitration process itself in
order to prevent post-award disputes and challenges.

